Financing GHG emission reduction projects in agriculture in Ukraine - use options for markets related to the Kyoto Protocol by -
  
 
 
 
INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
AND POLICY CONSULTING 
German – Ukrainian Agricultural 
Policy Dialogue 
 
Reytarska 8/5-A, 01034 Kyiv 
Tel. (+38044) 278-6342, 278-6360, Fax 278-6336 
E-Mail: agro@ier.kiev.ua,  http://www.ier.kiev.ua 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Policy Paper No. 15 
 
 
 
 
 
Financing GHG Emission Reduction Projects  
in Agriculture in Ukraine 
 
- Use options for markets related to the Kyoto Protocol - 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: 
This paper was prepared by the authors using publicly available information and data from 
various sources. All conclusions and recommendations included in this article in no 
circumstances should be taken as the reflection of policy and views of the German Federal 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Consumer Protection.  
 
 
 2
Executive Summary 
1. Agriculture and food are important sectors in Ukraine with growing opportunities on 
international commodity markets driven by increasing demand for food, feed and 
renewable energy. At the same time Ukraine’s dependency of fossil energy leads to 
the search for new energy supply concepts. Therefore, decentralised energy 
production and energy saving is on the top policy agenda. So, one would expect that 
the Kyoto Protocol would provide a fruitful environment to allow for a boom of 
bioenergy production from agricultural residues in Ukraine. However, among 74 
Ukrainian investment projects proposed as JI projects so far, only two are 
associated to agriculture. 
2. According to the national GHG inventories and expert estimations, the theoretical 
annual emission reduction potential in Ukraine totals 170 mtCO2e/ year (table 1.2). 
The largest share (39%) could be contributed from biomass for heat production (58 
mtCO2e/year). According to national eligibility requirements, a project must result in 
20,000 tCO2e minimum to be eligible as JI project.  
3. The technical potential for emission reductions in agriculture at national level is 
huge, but the projects are characterised by small per project sizes and scattered 
distribution. Thus, transaction costs for emission reduction projects in agriculture 
under JI are considered too large; resulting in a competitive disadvantage of these 
projects compared to emission reduction projects in other sectors. 
4. In the current JI pipeline, the largest amount of emission reductions comes from 
coal mine methane projects (20 mtCO2e until 2012), followed by energy efficiency 
projects in the industrial sector (13 mtCO2e until 2012).  
5. In addition to the JI mechanism this paper shows use options of a financing scheme 
that is not officially related to the Kyoto Protocol but is evolving around the 
discussion of selling government owned emission reduction units: the Green 
Investment Scheme. 
6. Two case studies are presented, whereas the first case shows an investment into a 
biomass boiler (for sunflower husk burning) and CHP plant at a large financially viable 
agribusiness holding in the edible oil sector. The second case study is a straw-fired 
biomass boiler at a medium sized agricultural enterprise that sells heat to the 
neighbouring village.  
7. The first case study has a low risk profile. Input supply is secure and the project 
produces two asset streams. The contractual set-up, with the Holding as owner of the 
JI project and the oil processing plant as client of the JI project is quite unique. The 
interest of the Holding is to increase oil production, whereas a steam based process is 
a means to increase oil extraction efficiency. This structure assures a high sense of 
ownership of the Holding for both enterprises, whereas it creates semi-market 
conditions where the CHP plant has to compete with conventional heat and power 
prices. This project is expected to produce app. 40,000 tCO2e annually and is 
sufficiently large to attract foreign buyers of carbon credits under the JI mechanism. 
8. The second case study has a high risk profile for a JI project. It is by far too 
small with app. 500 tCO2e year to attract foreign buyer’s interest. Ten of these 
projects would have to be bundled to reach an interesting size for a foreign buyer of 
carbon credits. Project bundles of this size increase risk perception from a buyer’s 
perspective. If too many stakeholders are involved, the project becomes too complex 
and too difficult to handle. A number of contracts would have to be in place with 
several private and public actors. Performance would have to be checked at each site 
which would lead to high transaction costs. Finally the return per project from carbon 
credit sales for the stakeholders will most likely not be high enough to assure 
willingness to cooperate within a bundle of 10 projects. This project type would have 
a larger replication potential under a Governmental Green Investment Scheme (GIS). 
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9. The biggest obstacles that prevent more emission reduction projects in Ukraine from 
being realised are lacking funding sources of potential project owners. Carbon co-
finance is not the overall remedy to secure investments in a field where 
Ukrainian entities themselves do not invest. The returns from carbon credit 
sales occur when the project is running and producing emission reductions. So, they 
help to cover operational costs and assure smooth debt repayment. But the largest 
hurdle has to be overcome prior to the project with the financial closure of the 
project. 
10. In a usual set-up, carbon credit returns are not suitable for covering 
investment costs. Buyers of carbon credits would provide a certain amount of up-
front payment which could add to financial closure. Still, to provide upfront 
payments, buyers act as every debt provider would act: they ask for bank guarantees 
or other collaterals. But, access to bank guarantees and loans for agricultural 
enterprises is limited since land or other assets of the enterprise cannot be used as 
collateral. Municipalities are legally not allowed to use their property (e.g. parts of 
the existing district heating infrastructure) as collateral for loans. 
11. An international carbon buyer would not be willing to provide upfront payment to an 
agricultural enterprise, if this enterprise is not considered creditworthy by local 
institutions.  
12. Accordingly, under the current framework conditions, international carbon buyers will 
focus on large projects at large enterprises with sound financial standing. 
13. The two funding options proposed in the case studies (JI vs. GIS) shall serve to 
illustrate characteristics and strength of the two mechanisms. However, this paper 
does not emphasize to draw a strict division between both funding streams. Instead 
applicability should be assessed on a project by project basis.  
14. In order to allow for funding options under both mechanisms JI and GIS, 
improvement of the national framework conditions are needed. 
15. To create an equal-level playing field for small and big energy suppliers a feed-in 
tariff is considered a core step towards achieving the policy goal to increase the 
share of renewables and to reduce dependency of fossil fuel imports from Russia. 
Accordingly, it is highly recommended to maintain the discussion of calculating a fair 
tariff for small producers. 
16. The carbon market is just starting and several procedures and rules are still being 
designed. Thus, proactive contribution to discussions at national level of 
agricultural interest groups is necessary to assure agricultural sector representation 
in the design of national programs.  
17. Current discussions on the Green Investment Scheme at national level in 
Ukraine are directed towards using this mechanism to allow for projects that are not 
eligible under the JI (e.g. due to weak additionality). This would foster the 
development of large projects in the industrial sector leading to exclusion of most 
biomass projects. Under this scenario, again the agricultural sector would only 
marginally benefit. It can be expected that the international Government buying so 
called ‘greened’ AAUs from a GIS will pose some criteria on the scheme (to reflect 
their policies for international cooperation with Ukraine and their negotiation status 
under the Kyoto Protocol). Thus, most likely, the Ukrainian Government might face 
difficulties marketing a GIS stream that does not reflect international Kyoto market 
standards.  
18. In contrast, biomass projects are likely to attract interest from international 
Governments under a Green Investment Scheme. It is highly recommended that 
the Ministry of Agriculture contributes to the discussion around the design of a GIS 
with the Agency of Environmental Investments under the Cabinet of Ministers. In 
parallel to the discussions at national level, discussions should be started with foreign 
governments to promote a potential program under a GIS for agriculture. 
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19. A micro credit communal investment program could be a suitable set up for a 
GIS program for municipalities and small and medium enterprises. Applicable 
collaterals for loan applications could be defined under a communal investment 
program to assure credit access for communes. Since needed investment volumes 
are relatively small, the minimum loan size of such a program should be around 
60,000€. 
 
Glossary 
Assigned amount unit (AAU) - A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2 
equivalent.  Each Annex I Party issues AAUs up to the level of its assigned amount, 
established pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the Kyoto Protocol. Assigned 
amount units may be exchanged through emissions trading. 
Certified emission reductions (CER) - A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of 
CO2 equivalent.  CERs are issued for emission reductions from CDM project activities.  
Two special types of CERs called temporary certified emission reduction (tCERs) and 
long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs) are issued for emission removals from 
afforestation and reforestation CDM projects. 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) - Combined heat and power (CHP) systems (also 
known as cogeneration) generate electricity and useful thermal energy in a single, 
integrated system. This contrasts with the common practice of separate heat and power 
(SHP) where electricity is generated at a central power plant, while on-site heating and 
cooling equipment is used to meet non-electric energy requirements. 
District Heating System (DHS) - District heating systems distribute steam or hot water to 
multiple buildings. The heat can be provided from a variety of sources, including 
geothermal, cogeneration plants, waste heat from industry, and purpose-built heating 
plants. 
Emissions trading - One of the three Kyoto mechanisms, by which an Annex I Party may 
transfer Kyoto Protocol units to or acquire units from another Annex I Party. An Annex I 
Party must meet specific eligibility requirements to participate in emissions trading. 
Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) - A Kyoto Protocol unit equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2 
equivalent.  ERUs are generated for emission reductions or emission removals from 
joint implementation project. 
EU Allowance (EUA) – is the carbon credit unit equal to 1 metric tonne of CO2 equivalent 
used in the European Emissions Trading Scheme. 
Global warming potential (GWP) - An index representing the combined effect of the 
differing times greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere and their relative 
effectiveness in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) - The atmospheric gases responsible for causing global 
warming and climate change. The major GHGs are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4) and nitrous oxide (N20). Less prevalent --but very powerful -- greenhouse gases 
are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6). 
Green Investment Scheme (GIS) - The GIS is no instrument of the Kyoto Protocol. It is a 
voluntary commitment of national governments to dedicate the incomes from sales of 
state-owned emission reduction certificates (AAUs) to national emission reduction 
projects. 
Joint Implementation (JI) - A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol through which a 
developed country can receive "emissions reduction units" when it helps to finance 
projects that reduce net greenhouse-gas emissions in another developed country (in 
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practice, the recipient state is likely to be a country with an "economy in transition"). 
An Annex I Party must meet specific eligibility requirements to participate in joint 
implementation. 
Kyoto Protocol - An international agreement standing on its own, and requiring separate 
ratification by governments, but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto Protocol, among 
other things, sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions by 
industrialized countries. 
LoA (Letter of Approval) – An official document for projects that are approved by the 
Government under the JI Mechanism. LoAs are issued by the Ministry for Environmental 
Protection in Ukraine. The letters states that the Government will convert the 
equivalent of state owned AAUs to project owned ERUs, which is a precondition for 
every ERU transaction between the Seller and the Buyer of carbon credits. 
LoE (Letter of Endorsement) - An official document for projects that are endorsed by the 
Government under the JI Mechanism. LoEs are issued by the Ministry for Environmental 
Protection in Ukraine. The letters states that the Government accepts the project to 
apply under the JI Mechanism and considers converting AAUs to ERUs for the project. 
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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Introduction  
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005, and the start of the Joint 
Implementation (JI) Mechanism in January 2008, raises expectations and hope for fostering 
investment in energy production from renewable sources in many countries. The newly 
created carbon markets are an instrument to add value to a public good through limiting it’s 
use for industrialised countries. Agriculture has the potential to deliver multiple ecological 
benefits to the global society, through soil and water protection, maintenance of landscape 
and cultural heritage, among others. Agriculture plays a key role for mitigation of climate 
change impacts, through desertification prevention measures, development of drought 
resistant species, sustainable food production etc. The effect of agriculture to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) under the Kyoto Protocol, however, is limited to date. 
Although there is an enormous potential of using agricultural residues and primary products 
for energy production and avoiding emissions from dumping of organic waste, the 
contribution of emission reductions from agriculture currently counts for 3% worldwide only 
(World Bank 2006). 
Agriculture and food are important sectors in Ukraine with growing opportunities on 
international commodity markets driven by increasing demand for food, feed and renewable 
energy. At the same time Ukraine’s dependency of fossil energy leads to the search for new 
energy supply concepts. Therefore, decentralised energy production and energy saving is on 
the top policy agenda. So, one would expect that the Kyoto Protocol would provide a fruitful 
environment to allow for a boom of bioenergy production from agricultural residues in 
Ukraine. However, among 74 investment projects proposed as JI projects so far, only two 
are associated to agriculture. 
According to national eligibility requirements, a project must result in 20,000 tCO2e 
minimum to be eligible as JI project. The technical potential for emission reductions in 
agriculture at national level is huge, but the projects are characterised by small per project 
sizes and scattered distribution. Thus, transaction costs for emission reduction projects in 
agriculture under JI are considered too big; resulting in a competitive disadvantage of these 
projects compared to emission reduction projects in other sectors. So, in addition to the JI 
mechanism this paper will discuss use options of a financing scheme that is not officially 
related to the Kyoto Protocol but is evolving around the discussion of selling government 
owned emission reduction units: the Green Investment Scheme (GIS). 
In a first step, this paper explores the technical potential for emission reduction projects in 
Ukraine and Eastern Europe and discusses the current pipeline of JI projects by technology 
type. In a second step, this paper brings some light into the carbon markets under the Kyoto 
Protocol and the competitive disadvantage of emission reduction projects in agriculture. The 
third chapter provides further insights in characteristics of emission reduction projects in 
agriculture and provides two example projects (one under JI and one under GIS) with good 
expected replication potential in Ukraine. Last but not least, main barriers are identified and 
measures to overcome these barriers are proposed. 
This paper is meant to discuss issues and options, instead of providing solutions. 
1 GHG Emission Reduction Projects in Ukraine and Europe  
GHG emission sources 
In order to illustrate the potential leverage of emission reduction projects in agriculture to 
reduce overall national emissions, a discussion of main emission sources is central. The 
distribution of emissions by sources in Ukraine depicts the trend in EU member states.  
Table 1.1. Sources of GHG emissions 
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mtCO2e
% of total 
national 
emissions
mtCO2e
% of total 
national 
emissions
mtCO2e % of total EU emissions mtCO2e
% of total EU 
emissions
Energy 687.6 74.30% 282.5 68.32% 4320 76.84% 4,131 79.78%
Industrial processes 128.1 13.84% 91.4 22.10% 475 8.45% 412 7.96%
Solvent and other product use 0.4 0.04% 0.3 0.07% 13 0.23% 10 0.19%
Agriculture 101.4 10.96% 30.4 7.35% 595 10.58% 476 9.19%
Waste 7.9 0.85% 8.9 2.15% 219 3.90% 149 2.88%
Other 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
TOTAL 925.4 100.00% 413.5 100.00% 5622 100.00% 5178 100.00%
Sources: Annual Ukrainian National GHG Inventory 1990-2004, 
              Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990-2005 and inventory report 2007
Sector
1990 2004
GHG emissions in the EU-27
1990 2005
GHG Emissions in Ukraine
 
Table 1.1. illustrates that energy production counts for three third of overall GHG emissions 
in Ukraine and EU-27. In 1990, agriculture ranked third with almost 11% of the total 
emissions after industrial production processes with slightly more than 13%. In the EU 
context, emissions from agriculture exceed emissions from industrial processes. This trend is 
not reflected in data from Ukraine. Instead, emissions from the industrial sector now 
contribute more than 22% to total national emissions, while the share from agriculture 
reduced to 7.35 %. These changes have to be seen in the light of the sharp decrease of the 
overall emissions in Ukraine by more than 50% from 925 mtCO2e in 1990 to 413 CO2e in 
2004. This reduction is a result of economic recession and the break down of industrial 
production in Ukraine, which touched upon both, agriculture and industry sectors. 
GHG emission reduction potential 
According to the national GHG inventories and expert estimations, the theoretical annual 
emission reduction potential in Ukraine totals 170 mtCO2e/ year (table 1.2). The largest 
share (39%) could be contributed from biomass for heat production (58 mtCO2e/year), 
whereas the potential for power production is relatively small. 
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Table 1.2. Technical Potential for Emission Reductions in Ukraine (2005) 
Energy production potential ER potential
mtce % of total consumption mtCO2e
Industry: CHP 8.12 4.05 23.39
Insulation of Houses 1.93 0.96 5.56
Restoration of DHS 6.12 3.05 17.63
Biomass for Heat 20.30 10.12 58.46
Biomass for Power 0.60 0.30 1.73
Biofuels 2.20 1.10 6.34
Landfills 0.30 0.15 3.88
Coal Mines 9.90 4.93 28.50
Fixing gas pipelines 0.40 0.20 8.30
Crop waste* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Manure management* 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wind 0.70 0.35 2.02
Solar 0.27 0.13 0.78
Hydro (small) 1.30 0.65 3.74
Geothermal 1.09 0.54 3.14
N2O 6.84
SF6 0
HFC23 0
53.22 26.53 170.30
Sector Project Type
Energy efficiency
Avoided industrial gases 
emissions
Renewable energy
Sources: (1) Geletukha G.G., Dolinsky A.A. Presentation at Third International Conference on 
Biomass for Energy (18-20 September 2006, Kiev, Ukraine);
(2) Expert estimate of SEC Biomass;
(3) Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period till 2030;
(4) Annual National GHG Inventory (1990-2004);
* no data available
TOTAL
Bioenergy
Avoided methane emissions
 
Table 1.2 shows that avoiding methane emissions at coal mines has the second largest 
potential to reduce GHG emissions (28 mtCO2e/year), followed by energy efficiency 
measures in the industrial sector (Combined Heat and Power Production) which could 
potentially lead to a reduction of 20 mtCO2e/year. Due to a lack of data, table 1.2 does not 
provide figures on potential emission reductions from avoided methane emissions in 
agriculture (e.g. improved manure management and avoided/ improved dumping of organic 
waste). Thus, the overall potential for agriculture is expected to be higher due to the high 
global worming potential of methane (see table 1.4). 
ER project pipeline in Ukraine 
For the time being, the Government of Ukraine does not apply selection criteria for emission 
reduction projects. Basically all projects that safe energy and reduce emissions are 
accepted. The Energy Strategy of Ukraine foresees an increase of non-traditional and 
renewable sources for energy production by 3.7 times until 2030 (from 15.51 mtce in 2005 
to 57.73 mtce in 2030). This would correspond to a growth of bioenergy production of 700% 
(from 1.3 mtce in 2005 to 9.2 mtce in 2030). To date, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection has issued 74 Letters of Endorsement and 11 projects have obtained Letters of 
Approval, meaning that these 11 projects will yield ERUs once the national procedure for 
ERU issuance is in place. 
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Table 1.3. Projects with LoE and LoA from the Ukrainian Government 
Project type No.of projects
Average size 
(mtCO2e)
Min. size 
(mtCO2e)
Max. size 
(mtCO2e)
Total  
(mtCO2e)
Coal Mine Methane 11 1.89 0.26 8.7 20.83
Energy Efficency 11 1.25 0.1 8.61 13.72
Waste 18 0.35 0.14 1.24 6.29
District Heating 5 0.52 0.3 0.89 2.62
Biomass 3 0.27 0.22 0.32 0.8
N2O 4 1.85 1.33 2.15 7.4
Cogeneration 12 0.92 0.19 6.09 11.05
Renewables 2 2.23 1.3 3.17 4.47
Other 8 2.29 0.29 8.05 18.29
TOTAL 74 85.47
Coal Mine Methane 3 3.462 0.263 8.705 10.386
Energy Efficency 3 1.296 0.351 3.1 3.888
Waste 1 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332
District Heating 3 0.645 0.344 0.887 1.935
Renewables 1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
TOTAL 11 17.841
Source: Ministry of Environmental Protection of Ukraine, Status: Oct. 2007
Projects with Letter of Endorsement (LoE)
Projects with Letter of Approval (LoA)
 
Table 1.3 depicts the current pipeline of JI projects in Ukraine. The largest amount of 
emission reductions comes from coal mine methane projects (20 mtCO2e until 2012), 
followed by energy efficiency projects in the industrial sector (13 mtCO2e until 2012). Of the 
total 74 projects in the pipeline, three projects are related to agriculture and forestry. Two of 
them are about utilization of sunflower husk for steam and electricity production at oil 
extraction plants in Kirovograd and Pology, one is related to the wood processing industry. 
In total they will reduce 803,000 tCO2e until 2012. The two renewable energy projects are 
wind farms. Above figures show that the average size of biomass projects is with app. 
270,000 CO2e significantly lower than the average size of coal mine methane projects (1.9 
mtCO2e) or energy efficiency (1.2mtCO2e). The small project size leads to relatively high 
transaction costs per tCO2e. As a consequence, project developers and buyers of carbon 
credits tend to cream off the big and easy projects, before looking into the potential of 
smaller projects. 
Among the projects with Letters of Approval there is so far none related to agriculture. The 
district heating projects foresee switching from fossil coal to fossil gas. 
 10 
ER project pipeline in all JI countries 
This trend described for Ukraine is similarly reflected in all JI countries1. The current pipeline 
of all JI projects counts 183 projects that are in advanced planning stage (validation or 
determination2), totalling in a potential volume of 36.6 m ERUs (or mtCO2e) until 2012.  
       
Figure 1.a is based on 
data for projects in the 
pipeline in all JI 
countries. It shows that 
more than 50% of this 
volume comes from 
non-CO2 gases (CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs). In 
terms of number, 
projects producing 
renewable energy 
contribute the largest 
share (78 out of 183 
projects, counting for 
42%).  
 
                                            
1 JI countries in this pipeline are: Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech republic, Romania, Poland, Hungary, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Germany, New Zealand 
2 ‘Validation’ is a third party check of the project by an accredited certification company. ‘Determination’ 
refers to the step in the JI project cycle, where the project is presented to the official UN body for the 
mechanism, the JI Supervisory Committee (JISC). 
Energy 
efficiency
24%
Renewables
17%
Fuel switch
7%
Afforestation & 
Reforestation
0% HFCs, PFCs & 
N2O reduction
8%
CH4 reduction 
& Cement & 
Coal mine/bed
44%
  Source: CD4CDM, JI pipeline, UNEP Risoe Centre, status: 27.08.07 
Figure 1.a: ERUs until 2012 (%) in each category 
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Figure 1.b provides further insights into the category of renewables that in total contribute 
17% of emission reductions in above figure 1.a. The largest contribution comes from wind 
projects, followed 
by biomass projects 
and hydro power 
projects. 
Biomass use 
contributes 32% to 
expected emission 
reductions in the 
renewable energy 
sector. This 
corresponds to a 
contribution of 6% 
to the total volume 
of expected 
emission 
reductions.  
In real numbers, a 
total of 19 biomass 
energy projects are 
in an advanced planning stage, with a combined expected volume of slightly more than two 
million ERUs. This results in an average project size of 100,000 ERUs until 2012, and 20,000 
ERUs per year (from 2008 to 2012). 
The cost of emission reduction 
Although the enormous potential of bioenergy projects is evident, these projects currently 
dont get off the ground. One major reason for that are the comparatively high carbon 
abatement costs of bioenergy projects. This partly lies in the nature of green house gases. 
Carbon dioxide is less harmful to the atmosphere than other gases. Avoiding one ton of 
Hydrofluorcarbons (HFC 23 is a by-product from HCFC 22 production. HCFC 22 is a cooling 
liquid in air conditions and fridges) is equivalent to avoiding app. 10,000 t of CO2. HFC 23 
emissions can be avoided through filtering or burning the emission gas at high 
temperatures. This process costs less than 1€/ tCO2e. Instead, avoiding one ton of carbon 
through a bioenergy project will likely lead to abatement costs between 20 and 50 €/ tCO2e 
(Mc Kinsey, 2007). Table 1.4 depicts the Global Warming Potential of the gases treated 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Table 1.4: The Global Warming Potential (GWP) of Greenhouse Gases 
Greenhouse gas GWP 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 1 
CH4 Methane 21 
N2O Nitrous oxide 310 
HFCs Hydrofluorocarbons 140 - 11.700 
PFCs Perfluorocarbons 6.500 - 9.200 
SF6 Sulfur hexafluoride 23.900 
 
 
Figure 1.a: ERUs until 2012 (%) in each category 
Biomass 
Energy
32%
Biogas
7%
Wind 
36%
Solar
0%
Geothermal 
3%
Tidal
0%
Hydro
22%
Figure 1.b: ERUs until 2012 (%) from renewables by technology 
Source: CD4CDM, JI pipeline, UNEP Risoe Centre, status: 27.08.07 
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2 The Carbon Market in Central and Eastern Europe– a short overview 
Carbon credit units 
The carbon market is a general term meaning transactions of different carbon units (all of 
them being equal to one metric tone of carbon dioxide) on three markets:  
1. EU internal: Governments and private companies within the EU-15 trade EUAs 
(within the framework of the EU-ETS3). 
2. Inter Governmental: Governments from economies in transition with surplus AAUs 
can sell AAUs to other Governments. 
3. National project to international government or private company: Project 
owners of emission reduction projects can sell the emission reductions as ERUs to 
governments or private companies4. 
Every unit is equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide, but prices for the units are different. 
A discussion of prices and price drivers for the different commodities would clearly exceed 
the purpose of this paper. Buyers and sellers in the JI world often use the EU internal EUA 
price as index for ERU prices. ERU prices in a flexible price scenario consist of a fixed floor 
price plus a flexible price indexed to the EUA. In the EU-ETS, EUAs are valid for certain 
years.  
Figure 2.a: Daily EUA price index  
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Source: ECX Status: 12.02.2008, cited in 3C Marktreport, 02.10.2007, internal publication, 3C Markets 
AG 
Figure 2.a shows EUA daily price indexes for the period January 2006 to September 2007, as 
noted by the London based European Climate Exchange (ECX). In the beginning of 2006, the 
market was bullish showing increasing prices until April 26th. That day, a report of the 
European Commission became public by accident, providing figures showing an over 
allocation of EUAs for the year 2007. EUA prices dropped sharply, of which the price for 
EUAs for 2007 (Dec07) not recovered and continued to loose value. EUA prices for 2008 
(Dec08) and 2009 (Dec09) went down to a minimum of 13.50 € early this year, climbed 
again to the 20€ benchmark and are currently being traded at slightly above 21€ at the 
moment. Power, carbon and gas are the main commodities affecting EUA prices. Information 
                                            
3 The EU-ETS is the European Emissions Trading Scheme, set up according to article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
4 Some countries allow for unilateral projects, these are projects where seller and buyer are from the same 
country. However, to date not such unilateral project is being observed.  
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about EUA prices can be obtained at European stock markets (e.g. Nordpool, Powernext, 
EXC, for websites see Annex 1).  
Since no AAU transaction took place so far, no prices can be reported5. However, prices are 
expected to be lower than for ERUs due to the enormous over supply.  
ERU prices are negotiated between the seller and the buyer. Main price drivers for ERUs are: 
? Size of the project (amount of ERUs) 
? Payment schedule for ERUs (advance payment necessary?) 
? Country risk (any changes in tax and property regulation etc.?) 
? JI related risk (e.g. will the project receive a Letter of Approval from the 
Government?) 
? Project specific risk (technology risk, financial risk, counterparty risk, 
environmental risk) 
? Contracting risk (how many counterparties are involved? Are there conflicts of 
interest?) 
In the evaluation report of the carbon markets in 2006, the World Bank reported prices for 
ERUs to range between 4 to 10 US$/ ERU (State and trends of the carbon markets, 2006, 
IETA and WB, 2006). 
Carbon credit buyers 
Buyers of carbon credits can be governmental procurement vehicles (e.g. governmental 
carbon funds), mixed public/ private funds or private companies (e.g. commercial funds, 
foreign power utilities etc.) from an industrialised country. Annex 2 depicts an indicative list 
of main buyers active in Ukraine. 
Carbon credit sellers 
The sellers of carbon credits can be private or state-owned companies or organisations who 
own a project that reduces emissions. This can be a municipality that owns a district heating 
system and aims to install a biomass boiler, or a medium size private agricultural enterprise 
that invests in biogas production and utilisation or a large power utility that installs a turbine 
to use waste heat of power production and increase energy efficiency. 
Institutional framework for carbon markets in Ukraine 
The Supreme Council of Ukraine ratified the Kyoto Protocol (KP) on February 4th, 2004. 
Since then, a number of Laws and Decrees were ratified to steer implementation of KP 
mechanism. Annex 3 depicts an overview of the legal framework for Kyoto Protocol 
implementation in Ukraine. Administrative implementation of the Orders and Decrees lies 
with two authorities: 
1. The Ministry of Environmental Protection of Ukraine (MEPU) is the so-called ‘Designated 
Focal Point’ according to JI terminology. The MEPU is authorized by the national Government 
and the UNFCCC to coordinate all Kyoto related activities in Ukraine.  
2. The National Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine that was created on April 4th 
2007. 
The carbon market in countries in transition (including Ukraine) allows for two types of 
institutional set-ups for carbon transactions: (i) the project based Joint Implementation 
mechanism as defined in article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, and (ii) the Green Investment 
Scheme that is a voluntary framework that is being discussed for selling state-owned 
emission reduction certificates. 
                                            
5 Latvia is planning for the first AAU transaction of 5 million AAUs until the end of 2007. Ukraine, Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland are considered to be second first mover in setting up internal AAU selling 
procedures.  
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In Ukraine, the Joint Implementation mechanism is managed by the Ministry of 
Environment through the Department for the Support of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation 
and Regulation of Ozone depleting. The Ministry of Environment is the key authority to deal 
with all UN related issues and the Kyoto Protocol, having a legal basis on resolution No. 206, 
273, 341 and order No. 342 (Annex 3).Projects that are seeking to generate incomes 
through carbon credit sales, submit relevant project documentation to the Department. In a 
first assessment, the agency approves projects through submitting Letters of Endorsement 
(LoE). After this, projects may apply for Letters of Approval (LoA), which is then equal to a 
guarantee of the government that the project will be allocated the required amount of 
emission reductions (in form of AAUs) for selling ERUs.  
Main actors in Joint Implementation (JI) projects 
are:  
• Project owner (e.g. the municipality owning a 
district heating system/ a private company 
owning a factory) 
• Project developer (a consulting company that 
supports the project owner in developing JI 
related documentation and obtaining relevant 
national approvals)  
• Ukrainian Government through the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection, Department for 
the Support of the Kyoto Protocol 
Implementation and Regulation of Ozone-
depleting 
• Buyer of carbon credits.  
In the JI mechanism, emission reductions of 
each project are approved by the national 
Government, which then puts aside the 
equivalent amount of AAUs. This setting aside of 
AAUs converts the project owned emission reductions from state to private property and 
turns them to the unit ERU (Emission Reduction Unit) which is tradable between the project 
owner and the carbon buyer. A future contract is closed for the delivery of ERUs between the 
project owner and the buyer. 
 
The Green Investment Scheme (GIS) has a different origin than the JI mechanism. The 
GIS is no instrument of the Kyoto Protocol. It is a voluntary commitment of the national 
government of Ukraine to dedicate the incomes from sales of state-owned emission 
reduction certificates (AAUs) to national emission reduction projects. Since the surplus 
amount of AAUs is a by-product of the economic collapse but not a result of good 
environmental policy, international actors strongly emphasize to link AAU sells to 
investments in clean energy sources in the own country. Due to the enormous supply of 
AAUs from Russia and Ukraine, particularly, it is expected that the demand side will focus on 
so-called ‘greened’ AAUs. So, ‘greening’ AAUs through a GIS is the most promising way for 
Ukraine to sell AAUs6. There is no official procedure on how to implement a GIS. Instead, it 
is to the Governments to design a scheme that fits in the national strategic plan and budget 
allocation. Since the demand for AAUs comes from other Governments (or public funds 
representing a number of Governments, like the Prototype Carbon Fund of the World Bank), 
it is likely that these Governments will want to be involved in the selection of project types 
eligible under a GIS financed from the revenues of their expenditure. It is not yet clear, 
                                            
6 The Hungarian Government just announced to have their Green Investment Scheme ready by January 
2008. In order to assure the quality of projects financed through the GIS, the Government considers to use 
ISO 14064-3 standard for emission reduction verification (http://www.pointcarbon.com/article24779-
472.html?articleID=24779&categoryID=472, 02.10.2007) 
Box 1 
AAUs – Assigned Amount Units 
With the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
industrialised countries have agreed to reduce 
their GHG emissions. The emission rights are 
capped for industrialised countries and 
economies in transition according to emissions 
in the base year 1990. These capped emission 
rights are defined as assigned amount units. 
Due to the economic contraction in Ukraine 
after 1990, GHG emissions these days are less 
compared to 1990. Ukraine has a surplus of 
AAUs that they can sell to other industrialised 
countries in need of additional emission rights. 
Estimations of the Ministry of Economy of 
Ukraine project a total of 2.225 billion surplus 
AAUs, of which 200 mio AAUs per year shall be 
used for GIS, 50 mio AAUs per year shall be 
used for JI and the remaining amount shall be 
held as a reserve.  
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which Governments will purchase AAUs and what criteria they wish to apply. This will all be 
a matter of negotiation between the Ukrainian and the foreign Government.7  
On April 4th, 2007, The Prime Minister of Ukraine approved a decree of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine to establish the National Agency of Environmental Investment of 
Ukraine8. This Agency has been immediately established and is now responsible for AAU 
trading. Rules and procedures for set-up and operation of The Green Investment Scheme 
are currently being discussed.The Agency is mandated to prepare a law on International 
Emissions Trading and to submit it for approval during the parliamentary session in autumn. 
For contact details of the Agency, please refer to Annex 1. An organisational structure is 
depicted in Annex 4.  
Main actors in GIS projects would be:  
• Project owner,  
• Project developer,  
• Ukrainian Government through the Agency of Environmental Investment 
According to recommendations of the World Bank (Ukraine, Options for designing a Green 
Investment Scheme under the Kyoto Protocol, Nov. 2006), a GIS could be designed as a 
targeted program in the Special Fund of the Ukrainian budget. This is reported to be in line 
with fiscal policy and would add to transparency in fund flows. It is reported that the Head of 
the Agency for Environmental Investments, plans to design a potential program under a GIS 
similar to a credit line that provides long-term loans. The idea is to avoid mere distribution 
of money (similar to a subsidy) and instead create a sense of ownership for the project and 
incentive to maintain the infrastructure in a well state in order to pay the credit back. 
However, conditions of this credit line are not defined yet. So, it’s applicability to the 
bioenergy sector remains unclear.  
3 Potential Emission Reduction Projects in Agriculture  
 3.1 Technical potential and implementation obstacles 
According to Kyoto Protocol definitions, project types in agriculture can be divided in two 
types: (a) fuel-switch projects that replace fossil fuel through fuel from a renewable 
source, (b) avoided emissions projects that do not produce energy but avoid emissions of 
greenhouse gases that would have occurred without the project. A combination of both 
types is possible, e.g. avoided dumping of wood waste from timber processing (sawdust) in 
open piles (avoided methane emissions) plus burning the wood waste in biomass boilers and 
replacing fossil fuel. The following project types are identified to be relevant for agriculture 
in Ukraine: 
• Heat (and power) production with biomass boilers (sunflower husk, straw, wood) 
• Heat and power production from biogas (at cattle and pig farms) 
• Reducing methane emissions (improved manure management, controlled treatment of 
organic waste from food processing industries, meat production) 
• Biofuel production (bioethanol, biodiesel, second generation fuels, energy crops) 
Starting with the latter, biofuel projects under the Kyoto Protocol are not efficient, both cost 
and emission wise. Several authors have shown that biodiesel and bioethanol production in 
Ukraine is not yet competitive without substantial subsidies (IER 2006, IER 2007a). 
Revenues from carbon sales will not be enough to fill this financing gap, due to the relatively 
small emission reductions produced by such project. One litre of biodiesel (from rapeseed) 
                                            
7 E.g. the German Government has the objective to comply with emission reduction obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol mainly through national measures. Only a small share is expected to be contributed under 
JI and no interest so far has been shown to engage in a GIS. 
8 Resolution of The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine №612 April 4, 2007, on establishing the National 
Agency for Environmental Investment 
 16 
replaces only 0.5l of fossil diesel and one litre of bioethanol (from sugar beet) replaces 0.6l 
of fossil diesel (OECD 2007). Under the JI Mechanism it is a precondition that the biofuel 
produced is used in the country of it’s origin. If the project foresees to export the biodiesel, 
no revenues from carbon credit sales will occur. Due to low in-country prices for mineral 
diesel (0.63 €/liter in November 2007), biodiesel production for the national market is not 
yet considered by national investors. Second Generation Fuels are expected to be a cost-
efficient alternative in the future, but the technology is not yet sufficiently developed. 
Growing and utilisation of energy crops (poplar, willow, miscanthus etc.) may be a good 
option in the future but are not yet in the pipeline in Ukraine. 
Methane emissions occur when organic material decomposes under anaerobic conditions, 
e.g in solid biomass piles or open lagoons (manure, sewage water from food-processing 
plants etc.). Solid biomass (sawdust, bark, organic household waste etc.) can be burnt or 
composted under aerobic conditions, both leads to avoided methane emissions (but carbon 
emissions, which have a smaller GWP potential).  
Liquid biomass can be used in biogas systems to produce heat and/ or power and replace 
fossil fuel. The size of the system and energy needs of the plant determine the suitable 
technology. An optimal biogas project under JI combines both carbon components: (1) 
replacement of fossil fuels and (2) avoiding methane emission from manure decomposition 
in open lagoons. Due to the high GWP potential of methane (21 times higher than carbon 
dioxide), the carbon component of avoided methane emissions is by far larger than the 
carbon component of replacing fossil fuel through producing heat and power from biogas. 
Since open lagoons for manure are not always common practice in Ukraine, carbon credits 
can often not be counted for avoided emissions. Under JI, average biogas projects in 
agricultural enterprises are rather small with max. 15,000 tCO2e/ year (table 3.1). Thus, 
bundling of 5 to 10 projects in a portfolio would be needed to make this project interesting 
to carbon credit buyers (most buyers have a threshold of a minimum production of 50,000 
tCO2e/ year, in order to keep transaction costs per project low). A farm with 20,000 heads 
of livestock could be suitable to form a single JI project, but these farms are limited in 
Ukraine. According to experts estimates, app. 600 average sized cattle farms have the 
potential to install biogas plants and app. 90 pig farms (SEC Biomass, expert estimate, Oct. 
2007). Larger biogas projects are associated to gas extractions at landfills or sewage water 
treatment plants. 
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of average ER projects in the agricultural sector in Ukraine 
Technology
Installed 
capacity 
(MW)
Capital 
requierements 
(m€)
ER potential 
(tCO2e/yr)
Project 
IRR 
(%)
Payback 
period 
(years)
Sunflower husk fired boilers 30 6 50,000 15 5
Wood fired boilers 13 4 23,000 30 3.2
Straw f ired boilers 0.6 0.61 575 43 2.2
Biogas production/ cattle farm 0.35 1.2 15,000 19 4.5
Biogas production/ pig farm 0.16 0.55 7,500 19 4.6
Improved manure management 
(aerobic treatment) 0 1.5 1,000 n.d. n.d.
Improved manure management 
(combustion of chicken litter) 25 50 50,000 n.d. n.d.
Source: Expert estimate of SEC Biomass, n.d. - no data  
Ukraine is a large producer of sunflower oil. In 2006, total annual oil production was 1.6m t 
(Annex 5a). Sunflower husk is a by-product of oil production that can be used in biomass 
boilers or for co-firing. To date it is common practice to dispose the husk on landfills. To 
date, only a few plants have installed husk fired boilers for heat production and one plant 
plans to implement a CHP unit. Sunflower husk boilers or CHP plants operating on husk are 
a promising option for JI projects in the sector. As shown in table 1.3, the average size of a 
JI project in the fat and oil sector can be estimated at 30 MWth with app. 50,000 t 
CO2e/year. Expert estimates indicate that there is a potential for app. 20 projects of this size 
in Ukraine (SEC Biomass, expert estimate, Oct. 2007). 
Another promising project type is the introduction of straw fired boilers. Estimates show 
that app. 5.6 mtce are annually could be obtained from surplus straw (see Annex 5b for 
further calculations). Boilers with an installed capacity of 100-300 kW are suitable for 
agricultural enterprises and farms with average heat demand. For heating public buildings in 
the rural area, an installed capacity of 300 – 1,000 kW is required. Again, table 3.1 shows 
that the implementation of one boiler is with app. 575 t CO2e/year far too small to serve as 
single JI project. In this case a portfolio of up to 50 small projects is required. It is estimated 
that in total there is a potential for 5,000 straw-fired boilers in Ukraine (SEC Biomass, expert 
estimate, Oct. 2007). 
Wood residues serve as fuel for biomass boilers as well. The average boiler size would be 
13 MWth with app. 23,000 t CO2e/year. A combination of two boilers could lead to volumes 
that are interesting for carbon credit buyers. For this project type, financing clearly would 
have to come from the biomass owner (e.g. sawmill).  
With regards to improved manure management, two types of projects are possible: (1) 
aerobic treatment (composting) and (2) combustion of chicken litter. Projects on aerobic 
treatment are rather small and to constitute a single JI project a portfolio of 40-50 projects 
are required. Chicken litter combustion is a very expensive technology with 50m € 
investment costs, thus experts consider this technology not competitive in Ukraine. Still, 
there is one project being planned (large-scale enterprise “Mironovskiy Khleboproduct”) 
where it seems to be economically viable. 
 3.2   Case Studies 
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In order to provide further insights in two project types that have good replication potential 
in Ukraine the following two chapters discuss two selected case studies. The first case study 
shows an investment into a biomass boiler and CHP plant at a large financially viable 
enterprise. This project is expected to produce app. 40,000 tCO2e annually and is sufficiently 
large to attract foreign buyers of carbon credits under the JI mechanism. The second case 
study is a biomass boiler at a medium sized agricultural enterprise that sells heat to the 
neighbouring village. This project produces a very small amount of emission reductions (575 
tCO2e annually), which makes it less interesting for foreign carbon credit buyers and more 
interesting under a Governmental Green Investment Scheme (GIS). 
 3.2.1 Case Study 1: Sunflower husk fired boilers under JI 
The example project is being implemented at an edible oil plant, which is owned by an Open 
Joint Stock Company (OJSC). The company is one of the leading edible oil producing 
companies in Ukraine and belongs to a bigger holding company. The plant has a 
comprehensive infrastructure of pre-treatment, hulling and winnowing, pressing, extraction 
and auxiliary division. The plant was modernized and partly reconstructed during the past 
years. As a result of these measures, the company increased its production capacities, 
including all parts of the production process – from storage to processing capacities. 
The objective of the project is to redesign the energy supply system of the oil plant so that 
100% of the sunflower seed husks are used for heat and power production. The company 
calculates with an extension of the production capacity, which will lead to increasing heat 
and power demand. The purpose is to supply heat and power to the enterprise at the 
expense of husk combustion, to reduce dependency on fossil fuel and avoid purchasing 
power from grid, and to avoid dumping of husk at landfills. 
 
 
Input supply: 
Core business of the company is to process sunflower seeds and produce edible oil. The 
company is one of the leading edible oil producers in Ukraine, thus input supply is 
considered stable and permanent. 
Box 2 
Key features – case study 1 
• Installed capacity: 30 MWth + 2.5 MWel 
• Capital requirements: investment 6 m Euro, operational costs 118 t Euro/yr, JI 
development 25 t Euro 
• Heat output per year (GWh/year): 180 
• Power output per year (GWh/year): 12 
• Amount of natural gas replaced (mio m3/year): 14 
• Grid emission factor (tCO2/MWh): 0.896 
• Emission reductions from fuel switch (ERUs): 25,000 tCO2e/yr 
• Emission reductions from avoided methane emissions (ERUs): 16,000 tCO2e/yr 
• Buyer of heat output: CHP plant sells heat to the company 
• Buyer of electricity output: CHP plant sells heat to the company  
• Additional revenue of the project: none 
• Fuel supply: 52 t sunflower husks/yr 
• Annual operating time (hours/ year): 8,000 
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 Income streams: 
The JI project has two income streams: (a) the revenue of carbon credits (ERUs), and (b)  
incomes of the CHP from heat and power sales to the oil production plant (except from 
losses and own consumption). 
 Ownership of the project: 
The CHP plant is owned by the holding. 
 Project Finance: 
 Share financed through equity:    76% 
 Share financed through debt:     0% 
 Share financed through JI:     24%  
Stakeholders involved in the project are the Holding and the oil production company. The 
Holding covers 100% of the investment costs with own equity. The ERU income stream will 
be used for covering operational costs and debt repayment. This will lead to a payback 
period of 5 years. 
This project has a low risk profile. Input supply is secure and the project produces two 
asset streams. The contractual set-up, with the Holding as owner of the JI project and the oil 
processing plant as client of the JI project is quite unique. The interest of the Holding is to 
increase oil production, whereas a steam based process is a means to increase oil extraction 
efficiency. This structure assures a high sense of ownership of the Holding for both 
enterprises, whereas it creates semi-market conditions where the CHP plant has to compete 
with conventional heat and power prices. 
As JI project this is a perfect set-up where no upfront payments of the certificates are 
needed since investment costs are covered by the Holding. 
 3.3  Case Study 2: Straw fired boilers financed under GIS 
The owner of the project is a private agricultural enterprise specialized in cereal production. 
The purpose of the project is to switch natural gas based heating systems to straw based 
heat production. For the purpose a 600 kW straw fired boiler is planned to be installed. 
Produced heat will be used for own needs of the enterprise and for heating social and other 
objects of the neighbouring village (school, kindergarten, administrative buildings). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Input supply 
The agricultural enterprise is financially viable and shows a stable production throughout the 
last years. Annual straw production totals 3,200-3,600 tonnes. App. 2,000 tonnes are used 
Box 2 
Key features – case study 2 
• Installed capacity (MW net energy output): 0.6 MW 
• Capital requirements: investment costs 61,000 €, operational costs 12,500 
€/yr, development for JI or GIS financing 11,000 € 
• Heat output per year (GWh/year): 2.58 
• Amount of natural gas replaced (th. m3/year): 293 
• Emission reductions from fuel switch (ERUs): 575 tCO2e/year 
• Buyer of heat output: neighbouring village 
• Additional revenue of the project: --- 
• Fuel supply: 746 tonnes of straw/year 
• Annual operating time (hours/ year): 4,000 
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for livestock production, leaving an annual surplus of 1,500 tonnes. This unused straw 
surplus is twice as much as what is needed it to run the boiler at full load. Thus, input supply 
is considered to be stable and safe. 
Income streams 
The project draws on two income streams:  
1. Heat sales to the village (paid by local administration) 
2. Sale of carbon credits 
Additionally, the company has fewer expenses for natural gas, which adds to the positive 
financing balance. 
Ownership and operation of the project 
The contracting set-up is straight forward. The agricultural enterprise owns and operates the 
boiler. A sales contract between the farm enterprise and the local administration about the 
heat sales is in place. 
Project Finance 
Share financed through equity: 100% 
Share financed through debt: 0% 
Share financed through carbon credits: 0%  
The project owner covers 100% of the investment costs. Incomes from carbon credit sales 
are expected to cover 38% of the project costs, which will be used to cover operational costs 
and debt repayment. The payback period of this investment is 2.2 years. 
This case study is an example, where the agricultural company is capable to do 100% 
financing of the project. However, this is an exeption rather than a common set-up. In 
Ukraine, small and medium sized agricultural enterprises have limited financial capacity 
which does usually not allow for such an investment in addition to their agricultural activities 
requiring considerable pre-financing. In order to make use of the technical replication 
potential of this project type a credit line from local banks allowing for loan durations of 3 
years is required.  
This project type has a high risk profile under the JI mechanism. For a JI project it is by 
far too small with app. 500 tCO2e year. Ten of these projects would have to be bundled to 
reach an interesting size for a foreign buyer of carbon credits. Project bundles of this size 
increase risk perception from a buyer’s perspectives. If too many stakeholders are involved, 
the project becomes too complex and too difficult to handle. A number of contracts would 
have to be in place with several private and public actors. Performance would have to be 
checked at each site which would lead to high transaction costs. Finally the return per 
project from carbon credit sales will most likely not be interesting enough to allow for a 
willingness to cooperate within a bundle of 10 projects.  
Two main obstacles hamper the replication of this project type at larger scale: (i) heat 
producer and heat consumer are not the same entity. The farm enterprise (often private) 
owns the straw but has limited heating needs, whereas municipalities have large heat 
demand and run a pipe network but dont own biomass. This would require a contracting set-
up that is not yet very common in Ukraine, (ii) Communal administrations as state entities 
are not eligible to receive bank loans and farm enterprises are not considered credit worthy 
due to lacking collaterals and credit history. With lacking funding options for the project at 
both sides, contractual hurdles between state and private enterprises can not be overcome. 
 
Thus, a national program as buyer of the carbon credits would be an optimal set-up for this 
case, where the investment is relatively small and the emission reduction volume below 
20,000 tCO2e annually. A Green Investment Scheme could provide a framework for a credit 
line managed by the Government, allowing for small credit sizes and pay back periods of 2 
to 4 years. 
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 4   Main Obstacles  
Financing Needsand Creditworthyness 
The biggest obstacles that prevent more emission reduction projects in Ukraine from being 
realised are lacking funding sources of potential project owners. Carbon co-finance is not the 
overall remedy to secure investments in a field where Ukrainian entities themselves do not 
invest. The returns from carbon credit sales occur when the project is running and producing 
emission reductions. So, they help to cover operational costs and assure smooth debt 
repayment. But the largest hurdle has to be overcome prior to the project with the financial 
closure of the project.  
In a normal set-up, carbon credit returns are not suitable for covering investment costs. 
Buyers of carbon credits would provide a certain amount of up-front payment which could 
add to financial closure. Still, to provide upfront payments, buyers act as every debt 
provider would act: they ask for bank guarantees or other collaterals. But, access to bank 
guarantees and loans for agricultural enterprises is limited if not lacking since land or other 
assets of the enterprise can not be used as collateral. Municipalities are legally not allowed 
to use their property (e.g. parts of the existing district heating infrastructure) as collateral 
for loans. 
An international carbon buyer would not be willing to provide upfront payment to an 
agricultural enterprise, if this enterprise is not considered credit worthy by local institutions.  
Accordingly, under the current framework conditions, international carbon buyers will focus 
on large projects at large enterprises with sound financial standing.  
Funding sources from international banks are lacking. In 2007, the EBRD launched a credit 
line with total volume 120 m US$ for energy efficiency and energy saving projects in 
Ukraine. However, there is no agricultural project in the pipeline so far. Loans are given 
under the conditions of commercial loans with a minimum size of app. 500,000 US$, 
whereas the loan duration is reported to be longer than the ones offered by national banks. 
However, this loan size is too large for most agricultural projects. Although the German Bank 
West LB shows a good track record in Ukraine, they do not have any agricultural project in 
their pipeline to date. Main reasons for this are too small loan sizes and difficult contracting 
set-ups for bundled projects. 
National banks provide loans under commercial conditions looking at hard security and fixed 
assets, which can often not be offered by agricultural enterprises. 
Complexity of the topicand awareness creation 
Stakeholders in this sector often lack knowledge about carbon-finance options. Due to the 
scattered business structure, with many small and medium sized farms distributed over the 
whole country, awareness raising and capacity building is extremely difficult. 
In the agribusiness sector, scepticism and lack of information regarding carbon co-financing 
in the top management level is common.  
High transaction costs  
For project owners in the country, JI projects come together with new contractual set-ups 
and arrangements that they are not familiar with. It is very common that the companies are 
not willing to take the transaction costs of informing themselves on the options and the 
market and arrange for JI project development. 
Carbon buyers face the transaction costs related to the due diligence of the project, complex 
contracting set-ups and supervision of contract implementation. These costs make buyers 
reluctant to enter into agreements where too many stakeholders are involved and where the 
contracted emission reduction volume is too low. 
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National framework conditions 
Several technical and institutional barriers exist in Ukraine effecting agricultural projects, 
particularly. 
• Ecological legislation is weak or hardly enforced so that positive ecological benefits of 
bioenergetic use of biomass and organic waste can not be factored in (e.g avoided fines 
for uncontrolled disposal of organic waste, production of organic fertilizer). 
• The country went through a period of political instability so that the country risk 
perceived by buyers of carbon credits and potential investors in bioenergy projects from 
abroad is perceived very high.  
• National technology providers are scarce or missing, leading to high equipment costs. 
• A feed-in tariff for producers of power from renewable sources is missing. For small 
power producers, the tariff is calculated at full costs whereas big power producers are 
usually calculating differently . The power distribution company at Oblast level chooses 
from which source to purchase power. Factoring in all production costs, small producers 
end up with higher power prices than large power producers that do not fully account for  
production costs at local level. Thus, without a feed-in tariff, small bioenergy producers 
are discriminated and will not be able to compete with large power producers using their 
power of monopoly.  
5 Conclusions 
The two funding options presented in the case studies (JI vs. GIS), should serve to illustrate 
characteristics and strength of the two mechanisms. However, this paper does not 
emphasize to draw a strict division between both funding streams. Instead applicability 
should be assessed on a project by project basis. 
Despite existing problems, positive trends can already be noted. The banking sector is 
rapidly evolving in Ukraine, with new credit lines being offered. A national fund for 
innovation and energy conservation projects was created in Ukraine not long ago.  
In 2008, a governmental program is expected to raise app. 1 billion UAH to provide grants 
to oblast administrations for reconstruction of oblast district heating systems. This could lead 
to investments in hundreds of straw-fired boilers, which could benefit from carbon co-
financing.  
A law for a ‘green’ tariff has been proposed and is currently under revision in the Verkhovna 
Rada and passed in the first reading. The law aimed at factoring in costs of gas cleaning 
stations in the power prices. This would lead to higher prices for conventional power and 
result in a doubling of feed-in prices for small producers. However, this law still has to go 
through the 2nd and 3rd reading and experts state that the initial approach of this law is 
already being watered. The final outcome will most likely not result in a law that provides an 
incentive for small power producers to take over ground. 
However, a green tariff is considered a core step towards achieving the policy goal to create 
an equal-level playing field for all energy provoders. Accordingly, it is highly recommended 
to maintain the discussion of calculating a fair tariff for small producers. 
In addition, further application of laws on environmental protection and imposing fines for 
environmental pollution would contribute to create a favourable environment for clean 
energies and foster the market for organic fertilizer.  
Improving the business environment for the domestic manufacturing sector for biogas 
equipment and biomass boilers would lead to reduced investment costs for such projects on 
the long run. 
However, all these measures are not likely to be effective unless the price for fossil fuel is 
not adjusted, factoring in all costs related to it’s production. 
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Set-up of a Green Investment Scheme 
The carbon market is just starting and several procedures and rules are still being designed. 
Thus, proactive engagement in the discussions at national level is necessary to assure the 
representation of the agricultural sector in the design of national programs.  
Current discussions on the GIS at national level in Ukraine are directed towards using this 
mechanism to allow for projects that are not eligible under the JI (e.g. due to weak 
additionality9). This would foster the development of large projects in the industrial sector 
leading to exclusion of most biomass projects. Under this scenario, the agricultural sector 
would only marginally benefit. It can be expected that the international Government buying 
so called ‘greened’ AAUs from a GIS will pose some criteria on the scheme (to reflect their 
policies for international cooperation with Ukraine and their negotiation status under the 
Kyoto Protocol). Thus, most likely, the Ukrainian Government might face difficulties 
marketing a GIS stream that does not reflect international Kyoto market standards.  
In contrast, biomass projects are likely to attract interest from international Governments 
under a GIS. It is highly recommended that the Ministry of Agriculture contributes to the 
discussion around the design of a GIS with the Agency of Environmental Investments under 
the Cabinet of Ministers. In parallel to the discussions at national level, discussions should 
be started with foreign governments to promote a potential program under a GIS for 
agriculture. 
A micro credit program could be s suitable set up for a GIS program for municipalities and 
small and medium enterprises. Applicable collaterals for loan application could be defined 
under a communal investment program to assure credit access for communes. Since needed 
investment volumes are relatively small, the minimum loan size of such a program should be 
around 60,000€. 
 
 
Authors: Anna Lehmann, Tetyana Zhelyezna, Alexander Filonenko 
                                            
9 ‘Additionality’ is a Kyoto related concept to assure that emission reductions produced by the project provide an 
incentive to implement the project. Meaning that without the cash inflow from emission reduction sales, the project 
would not be financially viable. This concept is designed to assure technology transfer and to avoid that Kyoto 
mechanisms provide hidden subsidies for sectors that already do have access to capital.  
